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Abstract
Most professional economists believe that economists in general
are more selfish than other persons and that this greater selfishness
is due to economics education. This paper offers empirical evidence
against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set about giving
behavior in connection with two social funds at the University of
Zurich, it is shown that economics education does not make people
act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the
particular behavior of economists can be explained by a selection
effect.
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Most professional economists, and probably most other scholars, seem to believe that the
following statements are a fact beyond doubt:
(1) Economists are more selfish than other people;
(2) Economists’ higher selfishness is at least partly due to their economics education.
Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993, 1996) seem to have convinced most of the academic
community that this is the case.
1 Using Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments, they found that
economics majors (at a particular American university) are more self-interested than non-
majors, and that this is caused in part by their education in economics.
2 They conclude that
there is ”... a heavy burden of proof on those who insist that economics training does not
inhibit cooperation”(1996:192).
But the literature on the topic has reached much less uniform conclusions than this statement
suggests. While Carter and Iron (1991:174), using an Ultimatum Game experiment find that
”economists are born, not made”, Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996:177) go as far as to
claim that economists are ”... actually substantially more cooperative than ... their counterparts
studying other subjects”
3. These inconsistent conclusions are mainly based on laboratory
experiments with students. These studies have the weakness that they cannot exclude that
economists see the experimental setting as ”an IQ test of sorts” (Frank 1988:226). Economists
may play the learned equilibrium while they do not apply it in real life. They may distinguish
between playing a game and acting in real life. An exception is the ”lost letter” experiment by
Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996). But they cannot control for personal characteristics (e.g.
gender and age) as they do not know who picks up the envelope. A second paper looking at
‘real world’ behavior is that of Laband and Beil (1999). They consider the differences in the
professional associations’ dues payment. These are income-based, however, income is self-
reported (hence, the correct amount cannot be enforced). With that in mind, they undertake a
survey of the members’ ”true” income and find that sociologists are more likely to cheat than
either economists or political scientists. If the ‘monetary’ incentives for cheating (owing to
different dues) are taken into account, the authors believe that there are no significant
                                                
1 Of course, some academics do not agree with Frank et al.: ”[...] I am among those who remain skeptical about
the significance of self-reported contributions to charity, or about behavior in hypothetical or small-stakes
Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments.” (Hirshleifer 1994:1)
2 An indoctrination effect is also found by Blais and Young (1999), who test the impact of the rational choice
model of voting on political participation in a national election campaign in Canada. Their 10-12 minute
introduction to Down’s participation model c.p. reduced the turnout of the students involved by 7 percentage
points. See also Brunk (1980) for a similar experiment.
3 Further studies unable to find a negative effect of economics education on cooperation are Marwell and Ames
(1981), Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993), Bohnet und Frey (1995), Seguino, Steven and Lutz (1996), Cadsby
and Maynes (1998), Stanley and Tran (1998), and Frank and Schulze (2000).3
differences between professional academics. But again, this study does not control for
personality variables, and cannot reveal to what extent the phenomenon observed is the result
of a selection or indoctrination effect. Therefore "[t]he effect of training and/or self-selection
on cooperation remains a wide-open problem" (Ledyard 1995: 161).
We use a unique and extremely large data set (more than 96,500 observations) to study the
behavior of economics students in a natural setting, to compare it with that of students of
other disciplines, and to analyze whether a possible difference in behavior is due to
indoctrination in economics education. We reach significantly different results than all the
other studies do:
(1) Political economists (to use the classical term) are not more selfish than the average
student, but students of business economics are more selfish.
(2) The higher selfishness of business students is due to self-selection, not indoctrination.
(3) Students of the economic sciences (i.e. both political and business economists) are about
as selfish as law students, but much less selfish than medical and veterinary students.
It follows that political economists should be more comfortable with their subject than most
of them tend to be – it is in this respect not the dismal science it is often claimed to be.
Professors of political economics cannot be faulted. But business schools, on the other hand,
should be aware that they attract particularly selfish students and should take that fact into
account in their education. Our findings also serve to reject the often-heard claim
4 that
political economists create  the type of selfish persons (the homo oeconomicus) they
axiomatically assume in their theories.
Section I discusses the data and section II presents the analysis and results of our inquiry.
Section III draws conclusions.
I. The Data
Each semester, all the students at the University of Zurich have to decide whether or not they
want to contribute to two official social funds – in addition to the compulsory tuition fee. On
the official letter for renewing their registration, the students are asked if they want to
voluntarily give a specific amount of money (CHF 7.-, about US$ 4.20) to a fund which offers
cheap loans to needy students and/or a specific amount of money (CHF 5.-, about US$ 3) to a
second fund supporting foreigners who study at the University of Zurich. Without their4
explicit consent (by marking a box), students do not contribute to any fund at all. The students
give their approval with their signatures. Our data refers to the decisions made in the five
semesters from the winter semester 1998/99 up to and including the winter semester
2000/2001. The fact that every student of the University of Zurich has to decide anew each
semester, if he or she is willing to contribute to one or both of the social funds, generates a
large number of observations. We observe the decisions of 28,586 students who decide on an
average 3.4 times, depending on their number of semesters. The decisions of the five
semesters are pooled, which generates 96,783 observations. The data enable us to compare the
effect of studying different disciplines
5 on cooperative behavior and provides the opportunity
of controlling for a possible effect of economics education.
The organization of the study of economics at the University of Zurich allows us to control for
different levels of economic knowledge. In a first stage, the students undertake the basic
study, which takes about 2 years. After passing an exam covering the basics of micro- and
macroeconomics they enter the main stage and choose between political or business
economics. After graduating, the students may take up their PhD study. However, students
can already specialize in economics at high school. We control for this pre-university
knowledge (in economics).
The strict official procedures applied when renewing student registration offer a controlled
environment at the same time as using a natural setting. The results can therefore be compared
to the results on giving in fairness games in economic laboratory experiments. Moreover, the
amounts in question are similar to those that have been used in the experiments designed to
analyze the issue mentioned.
II. Analysis and Results
A glance at the raw data seems to indicate that economists are more selfish than other
students. 61.8 percent of the economics students (political and business economists)
contribute to at least one of the funds, compared to 68.7 percent of the students with other
majors. In the following sections, the two possible explanations for this pattern of behavior
will be tested: (1) selfish individuals study economics (selection hypothesis). The difference
in giving behavior is therefore independent of studying economics. (2) The students adapt
their behavior over time to the basic axiom of the theory they study (indoctrination
                                                                                                                                                        
4 See Kelman (1987) and Ostrom (1998). The latter warns: "We are producing generations of cynical citizens
with little trust in one another, much less in their government. Given the central role of trust in solving social
dilemmas, we may be creating the very conditions that undermine our own democratic ways of life" (p. 18).
5 The University of Zurich is the biggest university in Switzerland, with 20,000 students altogether, and offers the
whole range of disciplines which can be studied in Switzerland.5
hypothesis). Throughout their studies, economics students become more selfish according to
the principles of economic theory. Because the two explanations are not mutually exclusive, it
is important to discriminate between the two hypotheses.
Figure 1: Proportion of economists and

















Figure 1 shows the proportion of economists and non-economists who contribute to at least
one of the social funds, depending on how progressed they are in their studies. Three aspects
catch the eye immediately:
(i) The difference between economists and non-economists exists already at the very
beginning of their studies, before the students have had a single lecture in economics.
This supports the selection hypothesis.
(ii) A clear behavior pattern over time is not obvious. The difference between economists and
non-economists does not clearly widen as the students progress with their studies.
Therefore, the raw data do not seem to clearly support the indoctrination hypothesis.
(iii) There are big differences between political and business economists. The curve for the
two subgroups of economists starts when the students enter the main stage of their studies
in their fifth semester and choose one of the two directions in economics. Even after 2
years of studying economics, political economists are more prepared to give to one of the
funds than the average student. And the readiness of political economists to donate even
increases.6
In the following sections, these patterns are tested, controlling for the gender and age structure
of the different groups. Moreover, the extent of economic knowledge of the students is
controlled for.
1. Is there a selection effect?
To distinguish between the selection and the indoctrination hypothesis, we take a closer look
at the decision to contribute when first starting university (freshmen). Differences between
students of various disciplines at the very beginning of their studies (without having been to a
single lecture in economics) support the selection hypothesis. We control for economic
knowledge acquired at high school, the main source of pre-university economics training. The
dummy variable pre-university knowledge equals 1 if the students attended a high school with
an economic orientation and 0 otherwise.
6 A description of variables is provided in the
appendix.
Table 1 presents the results of a probit analysis. The dichotomous dependent variable equals 1
if the student contributes to at least one fund, and equals 0 if the student decides not to give
any money at all. Control variables are personal factors (age, gender and nationality) and
dummy variables for the semester in question. As in a probit analysis the coefficients are not
easy to interpret, the marginal effects are computed. They show how the probability of
contributing changes compared to the reference group.
TABLE 1
The first part of Table 1 suggests that a selection effect exists. Economists in the broad sense
(students cannot choose between business and political economics until they reach the main
stage of their studies) donate less to the funds compared to non-economists. The probability
that an economist contributes is over 3 percentage points less than for a non-economist. To
show that this lower willingness to contribute exists at the very beginning of the studies, the
variable for economists has to be jointly interpreted with "being a freshman in economics"
(freshman*economist). The results suggest that already when the very first decision is made
whether to contribute or not (it happens before the first lecture in economics), economics
students act more selfishly than non-economists do.
7 The differences between economists and
                                                
6 A special dummy variable for students who did not obtain their high school qualifications in Switzerland (and
for whom no information about potential pre-university knowledge in economics was available) did not prove to
have an effect. Hence, it was not taken into account.
7 The overall lower probability (-5.1 percentage points) at the time of the very first decision cannot be compared
to first period decisions in fairness experiments, where contribution is normally highest (see e.g. Ledyard 1995).7
non-economists at the very beginning of their studies remain if we run the same regression
with the subsample for freshmen only.
The estimate also controls for pre-university education: having a high school education with
an economics orientation is associated with a significantly lower propensity to donate to other
students. The probability of contributing is 3.9 percentage points lower. This effect can either
be a selection or an indoctrination effect. The important point for our study is that although
pre-university economic education has an impact, it does not explain the selection process.
Independent of the pre-university education, a selection of more selfish people into the study
of economics takes place. The personality variables show the following effects: all other
influences being equal, the older a student is, the more likely he or she is prepared to
contribute to the fund. While the effect of age is insignificant until age 30, it becomes
increasingly significant and important after age 30. Women and foreigners are less prepared to
give. The same holds for the number of semesters a student stays at the university. This last
variable suggests that repetition tends to reduce giving.
2. Is there an indoctrination effect?
A particularly interesting question is whether the teaching of economic theory has a negative
effect on students’ cooperative behavior. The more the students of economics learn about the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, the more aware they are that cooperation should tend towards the
Nash equilibrium, i.e. towards no contribution. For students who are not familiar with
economic theory, such a decline in cooperation is not expected to take place. If the difference
in giving behavior between the students of economics and the other disciplines increases with
every additional semester, the indoctrination hypothesis is not rejected. In order to capture
specific knowledge in economics, we compare the behavior of the students at each stage of
their studies. The reference group consists of non-economists in the basic stage of their
studies. The results in Table 1 provide an inconsistent picture with respect to the
indoctrination effect: Moving from the basic stage to the main stage of university education
raises students’ readiness to help other students financially by 3.9 percentage points. The
coefficient on the dummy for Main stage*Economist measures the differences between
economists and non-economists when entering the main stage, and hence serves as a test for
                                                                                                                                                        
The freshmen at the University of Zurich decide before attending any classes and without meeting any other
students. Thus, between the first and the subsequent decisions, an important variable changes, which can best be
described in terms of 'social distance'. For the effect of social distance in games, see Bohnet and Frey (1999) and
Hoffman et al. (1996).8
possible indoctrination effects. For economics students entering the main stage of their
studies, the probability of contributing to the fund is reduced by 6.7 percentage points – in
addition to the general effect for entering the main stage. But this result does not necessarily
indicate the impact of indoctrination because the probability of contributing increases for
doctoral students in economics, while for doctoral students in other disciplines the willingness
to donate decreases. If indoctrination really influenced the behavior of students, the effect
should be strongest at the doctoral level, where the students have absorbed the largest amount
of economics teaching.
The results and interpretation of an indoctrination effect presented above are problematic in
especially one respect: students in the main stage of their studies can be a particular selection
of people compared to students in the basic stage because a large proportion of students does
not pass the exam enabling them to enter the main stage. The same argument can be raised
with respect to Ph.D. students, who certainly differ in many respects from students working
only for their Masters Degree. Thus, a sample selection bias cannot be excluded. To eliminate
these doubts, we test the indoctrination effect in a conditional logit model with personal fixed
effects. With this method, we can exclude any selection biases by holding unobserved
personal characteristics constant.
Table 2 presents the results of the conditional fixed effects logit model. Because in this kind
of model only students are of interest who have at least once altered their decision, i.e.
changed their mind with respect to contributing to the funds, the sample is reduced to 7129
persons. These students decided on average 4.2 times, which leads to 29,874 observations.
TABLE 2
In table 2, a possible indoctrination effect is modeled in two ways: in model I, we look at the
effect of an additional semester in economics, while in model II, the explicit economic
knowledge is captured by the different stages in the studies. Both methods allow us to address
the issue of whether students become less generous as they progress in their studies. The
coefficients have to be interpreted as the effect of a change in economic knowledge – either
through an additional semester in economics or through a shift from one stage to another. The
results in table 2 do not support the indoctrination effect. Neither the coefficient of an
additional semester in economics nor the coefficient of the relevant interaction terms Main
stage*Economist and Ph.D.*Economist have the right sign for an indoctrination effect.
Moreover, they are far from being statistically significant.9
A robust effect seems to be that students contribute less the first time they have to decide.
Thus, the coefficient shows that freshmen give less than students in the basic stage (reference
group). For an economist, such a ‘freshman-effect’ does not exist. We have to interpret the
coefficient for freshmen and the interaction term Freshman*Economist jointly and they cancel
each other out. Freshmen in Economics do not show any different behavior compared to the
basic study. Once the first decision has been made, the probability of economists contributing
does not increase. This can already be seen in the descriptive analysis (figure 1).
Thus the data do not support a negative effect of economics education on giving. The data
enables us to exclude selection biases. The possible indoctrination effects of table 1 are due to
unobserved heterogeneity. This result is further supported first by looking at two groups of
economics students and second by comparing the behavior of students of economics with
students of other academic disciplines. This is done in the following section.
3. Behavior of students of political and business economics
Table 3 focuses on the differences in contributing to the fund between the two types of
students of the economic sciences, on the one hand ”political economists”, and on the other
hand "business economists". Students are allowed to choose between the two economics
majors only in the main stage of their studies, i.e. after they pass the exams concluding the
basic training stage of their studies (after approximately two years).
TABLE 3
Controlling for all the factors previously included in Table 1, political economists differ from
other students to the same extent as when they started university. The effect of political
economists entering the main stage (Main stage*Political Economist) is positive. Thus, the
differences between economists and non-economists even decreases, but this effect is not
statistically significant. In contrast, the probability of business students contributing to the
social funds is – in addition to the general effect – over 7 percentage points lower in the main
stage than in the basic study. The results do not support the effect of education in economics,
because political economists do not show any (statistically significant) behavioral differences
from non-economics students. But we are primarily interested in the behavior of political
economists because they learn economic theory the most intensively. Thus, an alleged
indoctrination effect should be the greatest in this group. Again we run a conditional fixed-
effect logit model (model II in table 3) to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The results10
support the conclusion that economics education does not have a negative impact on the
willingness to contribute.
As already mentioned, students have to choose between studying political or business
economics only after the initial 2 years and we therefore do not know if the general effect of
Economist (in the widest sense) has to be attributed to political or business economists. But
the five semesters enable us to observe how students, who later chose to study either political
or business economics, behaved in their basic study. The raw data is already convincing:
among business economists, whose behavior we know in the basic study, 61 percent donated
money to at least one fund. In contrast, 73 percent of political economists contributed in the
basic stage to at least one fund. This suggests that the selection effect identified is almost
entirely due to business students.
4. Comparison with students of other disciplines
Most of the previous studies about the cooperation of economists only compare economists’
behavior to one or two particular groups of persons, i.e. sociologists (Laband and Beil 1999;
Isaac et al 1985), biologists and psychologists (Yezer et al. 1996), astrologists (Frank et al.
1993) or nurses (Cadsby and Maynes 1998). Our extremely large data set allows us to
compare economists’ behavior with students of other disciplines. Table 4 compares the
contribution by the students of the various disciplines, again holding personal characteristics
and other variables previously included in Table 1 constant.
TABLE 4
The reference group is composed of students from the faculty of arts, which constitutes the
biggest faculty at the University of Zurich (roughly 8600 students). Looking at the ”pure”
effect of one’s chosen subject, students of the economics faculty are about as selfish as law
students, while a much higher proportion of theology students are prepared to subsidize other
students.
When students move to the main stage of their studies, their probability of donating increases
on average, as already stated. However, large differences between the different disciplines
emerge. For instance, being a student of veterinary medicine lowers the probability of paying
into the funds by more than 8.7 percentage points, compared to arts students (reference
group). Business economics students give 8.4 percentage points less than art students when
entering the main stage – this decrease in the willingness to contribute is as large as for11
veterinary students. When entering the main stage, students of political economy change their
willingness to donate to the same extent as the reference group (students of the arts faculty).
The interaction term that captures the deviation from the reference group is statistically
insignificant. Our results suggest that political economists’ willingness to donate money does
not diminish as they progress with their studies, compared to students of other disciplines.
When students graduate and take up their Ph.D. studies, the probability of their donating
money increases by 3.7 percentage points. For students of medicine, law, and veterinary
medicine, the readiness drops – in addition to the general effect (12.7, 9.1 and 9.4 percentage
points, respectively). When moving into the Ph.D. stage, political and business economists’
willingness to give does not fall in a statistically significant way compared to students in the
arts faculty. And again, our results suggest that, in order to isolate an indoctrination effect, it
is crucial who the economists are compared with.
5. Testing for other determinants of giving behavior
The question of whether there is an indoctrination or a self-selection effect was further studied
with the help of an anonymous on-line survey among the same student population of the
University of Zurich as the data set on giving behavior.
8 The response rate was 18 percent.
From this sample, we could use 2,321 answers containing answers to all relevant questions.
This sample is not totally representative (not surprisingly, a larger number of economics
students responded to the questionnaire sent out by two economists), but with respect to
gender and age, the sample corresponds to the distribution of students at the University of
Zurich. Model I in table 5 estimates a very similar model as in table 1 to see how biased the
sample is. This procedure can be undertaken because the survey is closely linked to the natural
decision at the university. The results show – compared to table 1 – that the sample is not
strongly biased with respect to the effect of the different stages in the study and the control
variables.
The most important question asked in the survey was again whether a person contributes
money to one or both of the funds. 73 percent responded that they did, compared to the 68
percent who actually contributed. Such differences between survey answers and actual
behavior have also been observed with respect to voting behavior (see Matsusaka and Palda
1999). Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (1998) show in an experiment that distributional
transfers are greater if they are hypothetical rather than real.12
The main purpose of the survey is to better control for factors affecting giving behavior
unconnected to the issue of indoctrination versus selection. The survey allows us to determine
the income situation, assuming that the better off a student is, the more likely he or she is to
help others (Andreoni 2001). Those students working on the market to help finance their
studies (which is a significant number of students at the University of Zurich) are expected to
donate the less, the more they finance their studies themselves (Thaler 1985). In contrast,
when parents foot their studies (and therefore the contribution to the funds), it is likely that
students are more generous with respect to their fellow students (Kirchgässner 1992). In
addition, various motives for giving money to the fund were queried: expectations concerning
the contribution of other students, one’s political orientation on a left/right spectrum (ranging
from 1 to 8; with 8= the furthest left), the fund’s perceived necessity and effectiveness, and
the perceived importance of individual participation (on a scale ranging from 1 to 8 with a 'No
Opinion' option; with 8 = the strongest emphasis on necessity and effectiveness of the funds,
and the importance of individual participation).
Model II in table 5 presents the probit estimates again controlling for age, gender and the
number of semesters.
TABLE 5
The survey once more suggests that the giving behavior of political economists does not differ
significantly from non-economists when they advance in their studies. Students of business
economics give significantly less when they enter the main stage of their studies. Model II in
table 5 reports a higher coefficient for economists in general than for non-economists, which
is due to the differences in attitudes and political orientations in the sample. Economists are
on average more critical about the funds and tend to be more on the right side of the political
spectrum – both factors lower the probability of donation. Because we control for these
variables in Model II, the coefficient for economists in the broad sense becomes positive. But
the differences in values and political orientation do not change the behavior of business
economists throughout their studies. They exist already at the beginning of their studies and
are independent of economics education. They therefore also support the selection hypothesis
that business economists are a special group of people.
The results on income and attitudes are not surprising. Income has the expected strong
positive effect on giving. The more a student finances his own living, the less he or she is
willing to contribute. The fact that the parents pay the fee does not, in a statistically significant
                                                                                                                                                        
8 The on-line questionnaire is reproduced at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/grp/frey/fragebogen.htm13
way, change the probability of one's own decision to donate. The variables reflecting students'
values all have the expected sign and are statistically significant. Expectations regarding how
many others donate money correlates positively with the decision to contribute. Of course, the
causality is not obvious due to the ‘false consensus’ effect (Ross et al 1977, Dawes et al.
1977). The variables used as controls are (with one exception) all statistically significant and
have the expected sign.
III. Conclusions
The analysis of the actual behavior of the students with respect to donating money to a fund as
a pure public good, as well as an on-line survey of the same population, allows us to draw
three conclusions:
(1) Political economists’ willingness to donate money does not diminish by studying
economic theory;
(2) It is the students of business economics who give significantly less than other students;
(3) The lower contribution of business economists, compared to other students, is due to self-
selection rather than indoctrination.
These conclusions are based on the real life behavior of roughly 30,000 students at the
University of Zurich but they are likely to be of general relevance. Zurich provides a good
example of a student body in a moderately large city. The students of economics, on which the
study focuses, receive a similar education in their particular discipline as do their counterparts
elsewhere, especially in the United States (for example, many of the textbooks used are
American). As a considerable number of the students are at the same time in gainful
employment, they tend to be in close contact with the rest of the population. The results
reached may therefore well apply to the behavior of economists in general, i.e. outside of the
university setting.
The conclusions drawn are important for two quite different reasons:
-  Political economists need not fear that they have a negative effect on students’ behavior
with respect to altruistic giving. The students, and in particular the graduates studying for
a doctoral degree, well understand that political economics does not offer any normative
advice with respect to giving.14
-  The charge often made against political economists, that they produce the type of selfish
homo oeconomicus they assume in their theories, is unfounded.15
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Appendix
Description of variables
Contribution to Funds Sample
Economic education: Dummies for economists in the broad sense, for political and for
business economists, and for high school knowledge of economics. The reference group
consists of non-economists, without any high school knowledge of economics.
Dummies for students of every faculty and interaction terms with the stage of study
respectively. The reference group consists of students of the arts faculty.
Stage of study: Dummies for freshmen (students starting university), the main stage and the
Ph.D. stage. The reference group consists of students in their basic study. Interaction terms
linking the dummies for economists and the stage of study.
Demographic factors: Dummies for age 26-30, 30-35, 36-40 and over 40, for females, and for
foreigners. The reference groups consists of people below 26 years of age, males and Swiss.
The number of semesters at the University of Zurich and the number of semesters squared.
Survey Sample
Economic Education: See above.
Income situation: Log of income at one's disposal each month. Proportion of living costs
financed by the students themselves. Dummy when parents cover the university fees. The
reference group consists of students who pay the fee by their own.
Values: Perceived necessity and effectiveness of the funds and perceived importance of
individual participation on a scale from 1 to 8 with a ‘No Opinion’ option; 8=the strongest
emphasis on necessity and effectiveness of the funds and for the importance of individual
participation. Political orientation on a scale from 1 to 8; 8= the furthest left. Expectations
about the behavior of others in percent (the question was: What do you think is the proportion
of students who contribute to one of the funds?).18
Table 1
Contribution of Economists and Non-Economists
University of Zurich 1998-2000
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Variable Coefficient Z-value Marginal
effect
Economist (1 = economist) -0.009** -3.596 -3.0%
Stages of study
Freshmen -0.143** -7.208 -5.1%
Freshman*Economist 0.034 0.661 1.2%
Main stage 0.109** 9.047 3.9%
Main stage*Economist -0.189** -6.092 -6.7%
Ph.D. -0.118** -8.806 -4.2%
Ph.D.*Economist 0.320** 6.695 11.4%
Pre-university knowledge -0.109** -9.543 -3.9%
Control variables
Age 26-30 -0.006 -0.443 -0.2%
Age 31-35 0.187** 10.974 6.7%
Age 36-40 0.362** 16.120 12.9%
Age over 40 0.525** 21.510 18.7%
Gender (female=1) -0.031** -3.531 -1.1%
Nationality (foreigner=1) -0.109** -8.260 -3.9%
Number of semesters -0.046** -23.084 -1.6%
(Number of semesters)
2 0.001** 13.712 0.02%
Period 2 (summer semester 1999) 0.075** 5.561 2.7%
Period 3 (winter semester 99/00) 0.137** 10.438 4.9%
Period 4 (summer semester 2000) 0.134** 9.855 4.8%




Notes:  Reference group consists of 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'without pre-
university economic knowledge', 'aged below 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester
1998/99'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the
University of Zurich.19
Table 2
Contribution of Economists and Non-Economists
University of Zurich 1998-2000
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Conditional fixed effects logit model
Model I Model II
Variables Coefficient Z-value Coefficient Z-value
Number of semesters -0.034 -1.361 -0.037 -1.489
Semesters in Economics -0.023 -0.780
Freshmen -0.387** -6.917 -0.440** -7.431
Freshman*Economist 0.424** 2.745
Main stage -0.100 -1.183 -0.146 -1.615
Main stage*Economist 0.340 1.446
Ph.D. -0.266 -1.183 -0.272 -1.825
Ph.D.*Economist 0.338 0.493
Age 0.111** 2.414 0.111** 2.415
N 29,874 29,874
Log Likelihood -11153.76 -11149.07
LR chi
2 0.021 99.96
Notes:  Reference group consists of 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'without pre-university economic
knowledge', 'aged below 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Data source:  Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the University of Zurich.20
Table 3
Contribution of Political and Business Economists
University of Zurich 1998-2000






Variable Coefficient Z-value Marginal
effect
Coefficient Z-value
Economist (in the broad sense) -0.104** -4.890 -3.7%
Stages of study
Freshmen -0.144** -7.261 -5.1% -0.442** -7.453
Freshman*Economist 0.051 1.003 1.8% 0.424** 2.743
Main stage 0.104** 8.784 3.6% -0.133 -1.531
Main stage*Political Economist 0.090 1.429 3.1% 0.982 1.879
Main stage*Business Economist -0.211** -6.764 -7.5% 0.184 1.025
Ph.D. -0.114** -8.504 -4.1% -0.259 -1.739
Ph.D.*Political Economist 0.090 0.885 3.2% -0.389 -0.334
Ph.D.*Business Economist 0.311** 5.395 11.1% 0.207 0.263
Pre-university economic knowledge -0.109** -9.535 -3.9%
Control variables
Age 0.110** 2.407
Age 26-30 -0.007 -0.523 -0.2%
Age 31-35 0.187** 11.001 6.7%
Age 36-40 0.362** 16.121 12.9%
Age over 40 0.525** 21.515 18.7%
Gender (female=1) -0.030** -3.445 -1.1%
Nationality (foreigner=1) -0.110** -8.279 -3.9%
Number of semesters -0.046** -23.115 -1.6% -0.037 -1.509
(Number of semesters)
2 0.001** 13.733 0%
Period 2 (summer semester 1999) 0.077** 5.663 2.7%
Period 3 (winter semester 1999/00) 0.140** 10.609 5.0%
Period 4 (summer semester 2000) 0.136** 9.999 4.8%
Period 5 (winter semester 2000/01) 0.176** 13.327 6.3%
Constant 0.674** 41.067
N 96,783 29,874
Log Likelihood -59453.408 -11147.988
(LR chi
2) 12.12
Notes:  Reference group consists of 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'without pre-university economic knowledge', 'aged
below 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the University of Zurich.21
Table 4
Contribution of Economists and Students of Other Faculties
University of Zurich 1998-2000
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Variable Coefficient Z-value Marginal effect
Economics -0.159** -5.729 -5.7%
Theology 0.239** 3.349 8.5%
Law -0.135** -4.719 -4.8%
Medicine 0.058 1.775 2.1%
Veterinary medicine -0.126** -2.697 -4.5%
Natural science -0.003 -0.086 -0.1%
Computer science -0.085* -2.131 -3.0%
Main stage° 0.113** 4.567 4.0%
Political economics 0.069 1.059 2.5%
Business economics -0.235** -6.554 -8.4%
Theology 0.030 0.277 1.1%
Law -0.111** -3.320 -3.9%
Medicine -0.140** -3.450 -5.0%
Veterinary medicine -0.243** -3.572 -8.7%
Natural science -0.186** -4.745 -6.6%
Computer science -0.132* -2.140 -4.7%
Ph.D.° 0.104** 4.724 3.7%
Political economics -0.113 -1.102 -4.0%
Business economics 0.099 1.641 3.5%
Theology -0.273* -2.251 -9.7%
Law -0.256** -6.750 -9.1%
Medicine -0.356** -9.499 -12.7%
Veterinary medicine -0.265** -3.882 -9.4%
Natural science 0.012 0.322 0.4%
Computer science -0.274** -2.854 -9.8%
Pre-university economic knowledge -0.084** -7.321 -3.0%
N 96,783
Log Likelihood -59081.479
Notes:  Reference group consists of 'students of the arts faculty', 'basic study', 'without pre-
university economic knowledge', 'aged below 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'.
Due to lack of space, the control variables of table 1 are not shown in the table.
° variables below are interaction terms.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the University of
Zurich.22
Table 5
Factors Affecting Giving Behavior
University of Zurich 2000
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Model I Model II




Economist (in the broad sense) 0.152 1.281 4.9% 0.391** 2.829 11.3%
Stages of study
Main stage 0.045 0.603 1.5% 0.080 0.944 2.3%
Main stage*Political Economist -0.245 -0.91 -7.9% -0.208 -0.648 -6.0%
Main stage*Business Economist -0.427* -2.523 -13.8% -0.413 -2.087 -12.0%
Ph.D. 0.011 0.103 0.4% 0.119 0.947 3.5%
Ph.D.*Political Economist 0.378 0.562 12.2% 1.234 1.614 35.7%
Ph.D.*Business Economist 0.250 0.481 8.1% 0.156 0.261 4.5%
Income situation
Log (income) 0.188** 3.88 5.5%
Percent of earning one’s own living -0.003* -2.249 -0.1%
Parents paying fees 0.067 0.785 2.0%
Attitudes and Expectations
Expectation about behavior of others 0.019** 11.327 0.6%
Political orientation 0.061** 2.617 1.8%
Necessity of funds 0.095** 3.49 2.7%
Effectiveness of funds 0.085** 3.235 2.5%
Importance of contributing 0.241** 10.963 7.0%
No opinion on 'necessity' 0.367 1.893 10.6%
No opinion on 'effectiveness' 0.479** 3.065 13.9%
No opinion on 'importance' 0.851** 4.84 24.6%
Control variables
Age 0.014* 2.153 0.4% 0.016 1.917 0.5%
Sex (female=1) 0.056 0.972 1.8% -0.180** -2.627 -5.2%
Number of semester -0.019** -2.83 -0.6% -0.019* -2.505 -0.6%
Constant 0.365* 2.253 -4.780** -11.393
N 2321 2321
Log likelihood -1322.2735 -979.11015
Notes:  Reference group consists of 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'males', who 'pay their fee
themselves'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Data source:  Own survey carried out at the University of Zurich.